# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 671st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all I should like on behalf of the Conference to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, who will be the first speaker in this plenary meeting.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Iraq, Algeria, Poland, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. I now call on His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf.

Mr. AL-SAHAF (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to present to you my congratulations on your election as President of the Conference on Disarmament. I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express the hope that this session will succeed in achieving its desired objectives. We are aware of the importance of this international forum for negotiations in the field of disarmament, and of the contribution it can make towards achieving tangible and balanced progress in this vital area, taking into account, before anything else, the interests and security of all members of the international community without discrimination.

The evolution of international relations during the past decade and the beginning of this decade makes it incumbent upon all members of the international community to recognize the fact that participation by all States, on an equal basis, in the promotion of the common interests of mankind is imperative. It should be participation based on the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the rules of international law and the principles of justice and fairness. Such participation should also be free from double standards and selectivity in the implementation of these provisions and rules, and should seek to promote real security and stability in all the regions of the world. No doubt the achievement of these objectives presupposes the adoption of measures and procedures for disarmament on a just and objective basis. This will ensure for all States their natural rights to security, peace and respect for their sovereignty and independence; a basis which should not permit any individual State or group of States to achieve selfish benefits and privileges at the expense of other States. Proceeding from this understanding, which is contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Iraq has been participating as an observer in the work of the Conference on Disarmament since 1989. It is also on the basis of this understanding that Iraq has adopted a position that calls for the expansion of the Conference membership to include all interested States.

In 1991, a full-scale war of aggression was launched against Iraq with the participation of armed forces in excess of half a million troops from more than 30 countries. These countries included a super-Power and some of the big Powers as well. In that war, the aggressors used all types of weapons in their arsenals, conventional, non-conventional and even internationally banned weapons. Immediately after the end of that war, my country was placed under conditions of extreme hardship both unique and unprecedented; and I feel it

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may be of benefit if I avail myself of this opportunity to apprise this Conference of these conditions in brief and within the time I am allowed.

Resolutions 687 and 715, which were adopted by the Security Council in 1991, contained a series of measures some of which were to do with the destruction of certain weapons and materials and equipment related to them, while other measures were about determining a mechanism for ongoing monitoring. In spite of the colossal and complex difficulties we have faced as a result of the untold destruction inflicted upon our people by an extensive and indiscriminate war against my country, a war in which Iraq's various civilian infrastructures constituted prime targets, we have cooperated with the Special Commission of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementing the provisions contained in resolution 687. Now, after more than three years of experience of working with the Special Commission and IAEA, it has become clear that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations under section C of resolution 687. This fact has been established in the joint minutes and reports agreed by the two sides during the four rounds of high-level talks held so far between Iraq and the Special Commission since July 1993. These rounds of talks were held in Baghdad and in New York alternately. During the fourth round of talks, which was held in New York towards the end of last year, Iraq declared its acceptance of resolution 715. Thus Iraq removed the last remaining obstacle impeding the implementation by the Security Council of paragraph 22 of resolution 687, concerning the lifting of the embargo imposed on the export of Iraqi oil and of any other goods and commodities originating in Iraq. On 3 December 1993, the President of the Security Council welcomed that development in the name of the members of the Council.

Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations provided for in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. All that remains now is for the Security Council to honour its own obligations, as provided for in paragraph 22 of resolution 687, by lifting the economic embargo which no longer has any justification, even under the Council's own resolutions. The continued imposition of the iniquitous blockade on my country constitutes irrefutable evidence of the fact that certain dominant Powers are seeking to impose upon the international community their own political positions, which are in no way consonant with the Charter of the United Nations, international law or the principles of justice and fairness. This course of conduct puts in jeopardy all efforts made by the community of nations to arrive at a fair and balanced set of rules and formulas in the field of disarmament, to establish a climate of security and stability, and to ensure the furtherance of the common interests of all member States of the international community without discrimination.

Iraq was amongst the first countries to call for the Middle East to be turned into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. Iraq and the rest of the Arab States have also warned against the fact that Israel is already in possession of a large stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles capable of carrying these weapons over great distances estimated at thousands of kilometres. Israel is still refusing to sign the non-proliferation Treaty.

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Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 provides for the goal of "establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery". Although more than three years have now gone by since the adoption of this resolution, we have yet to see any serious step or measure taken towards the implementation of this paragraph. On the contrary, we witness an arms race feverishly pursued by certain countries in the Middle East, some of which are devoting huge efforts to the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction. Given this very grave situation today, aren't we entitled to wonder about the motives behind the enthusiasm shown in hounding Iraq to such an extent as to threaten it with the use of military force, and then actually using this force with extreme ferocity, while in the meantime, there is silence about what other parties are doing, even conniving at that, if not helping them with their incessant efforts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction, as is the case with Israel? Is it not the right, and indeed the duty, of the international community and of this august Conference to ask the question: Can such biased and twisted methods and policies really ensure the achievement of security, peace and stability?

The position expressed by Iraq at the 1989 Paris Conference on chemical weapons was clear and stressed our commitment to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and our support for all international efforts made in the field of disarmament. Iraq was amongst the first States to accede to the non-proliferation treaties and conventions. Iraq has also stressed its view that any call for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons must be coupled with a similar call for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

Now that Iraq has fulfilled all the obligations and procedures provided for in Security Council resolution 687, we expect the international community to begin addressing the issues of security and stability in the Middle East region on an equitable basis far removed from double standards, and to demand that the Security Council implement without delay paragraph 14 of resolution 687. We also believe that this august Conference has a primary responsibility to take rapid measures to ensure the implementation of paragraph 14 of resolution 687 by turning the Middle East region into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. This Conference must not permit certain countries, well known to all, to exploit the critical and sensitive situation currently prevailing in the region in order to achieve suspect selfish benefits, which will inevitably aggravate the imbalance and lead to a further undermining of security and stability in the region, in addition to exposing the security and interests of its peoples to extremely grave dangers.

Iraq considers the priorities listed in the document adopted by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978 to be still valid. This document gave first priority to nuclear disarmament on the ground that nuclear weapons pose a grave danger to mankind and to the very existence of human civilization. The nuclear States party to the NPT bear a special responsibility in this regard. The establishment of a stable world unthreatened by devastating wars and conflicts cannot be accomplished unless we rely on fruitful cooperation, ensure that the world community is not dominated by certain Powers and that there is no interference in the internal affairs of other States, and refrain from dealing with issues on the basis of duality, selectivity and double standards.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from Arabic): I would like to welcome His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. I remember him well when he was representing his friendly country in India. We thank him for his valuable statement, which I hope will be of benefit to all.

(continued in French)

Now that the various subsidiary bodies established by the Conference have started work or will soon do so, I would like to share with you some ideas on the question of negative security assurances, which my delegation has the honour to coordinate within the Group of 21. It is understood that these ideas are put forward on behalf of the Algerian delegation alone.

For 15 years the many aspects of the question of assurances has been considered within the Conference on Disarmament. Many delegations have made proposals and no basic obstacles seem to stand in the way of drawing up a convention text. The Algerian delegation has consistently defended the idea of a multilateral convention because, like all the non-aligned countries, my country has not been satisfied with the unilateral declarations of assurances made by the nuclear States. By their very nature they are precarious, they can be revoked at any time and they are subject only to internal developments in States. Moreover, almost all the assurances formulated so far have been vague and have a conditional character which removes any practical scope from them. In addition, the conditions in which the Security Council operates do not enable us to conclude that a declaration by that body, such as that made in 1968, could constitute a sufficient guarantee for the non-nuclear States.

Last year the delegation of a State that does not possess nuclear weapons wondered at some length whether it was fair that States voluntarily giving up the nuclear option could benefit in return from negative security assurances. It is true that that delegation represents a country which is covered by many guarantees accorded it by allied nuclear Powers. Also, last year another delegation said that most States had not followed the nuclear option simply because it was beyond their reach. We do not approve of this interpretation and we are inclined to believe instead that the non-proliferation option has in most cases been a sovereign act of political will. It is for this reason that we believe that the need for negative security assurances, the direct consequence of a choice entered into in the light of international commitments, exists, and that it is time to satisfy that need. Not through the issuing of unilateral declarations, not through the adoption of a Security Council resolution, but through the conclusion of a multilateral convention binding upon all the signatories. Such a measure would entail undeniable positive consequences and would contribute to improving international relations. It would make the policy of non-proliferation easier and more credible and would bring proof that action undertaken by nuclear-weapon States to combat the spread of such weapons does fall within the context of a global

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strategy of peace and disarmament. Need I add that my country does not see the assurances as an umbrella under which States would shelter in order to implement a policy of nuclear armament? Quite the contrary, we accept that a State wishing to be covered by negative security assurances should enter into precise non-proliferation commitments. These commitments could take different forms (accession to the NPT or a regional denuclearization treaty, agreements with IAEA, a formal act of the State enshrined in its Constitution, etc.) and be accompanied by the possibility of verification. Once these commitments are entered into, the assurances should be unconditional, unlimited in their context and their scope, legally binding and not subject to any restriction on duration other than that related to compliance by the beneficiary State with its commitments.

Ambassador Hoffmann, whose skills my delegation has already had occasion to praise when he chaired the work of another ad hoc committee last year, suggested a very interesting outline for this year's debate within the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. I should like to share with you some general ideas which this document inspires.

As regards the importance of the subject, I should like to note that the question of negative security assurances has been debated well before the drawing up of the NPT, during its negotiation and at each review conference. Some have viewed the NPT as an unfair and discriminatory treaty. It is hence legitimate to wonder whether this Treaty is designed to set in store the situation obtaining in 1968; whether it therefore constitutes the enshrining in law of a specific "right" acknowledged to be held by a group of States. It might also be thought that this is a preventive measure designed to forestall dissemination, and hence a step towards the dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. It is this interpretation which we consider most in keeping with the spirit that obtained when the Treaty was being drawn up, and which best tallies with the goals the international community set itself in linking non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament. It is also this interpretation that enables us to say that negative security assurances constitute a right for each non-nuclear-weapon State which wishes to live without having a sword of Damocles hanging over its head. The concrete realization of this right would strengthen the credibility of the policy of non-proliferation and disarmament and would deprive its declared or undeclared detractors of all arguments. The review conference, next year, offers an opportunity to move in the right direction. It should dispel the misunderstandings and give the NPT its original meaning, one which is closely linked to the balance of the rights which States have for their security.

As regards the form that these assurances should take, we believe that the drawing up of a multilateral convention would be the best possible formula. On the one hand, such an arrangement would enable us to spell out the rights and duties of each of the parties; on the other, it could lead to a clarification of the current international strategic situation. States would

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be obliged to clarify their attitude towards the military atom. In acceding to the above-mentioned convention, they would opt to place their security in non-proliferation.

Which methodological approach should be favoured. We believe that the three possibilities proposed by Ambassador Hoffmann are not mutually exclusive. The substantive discussion of negative security assurances has already enabled us to determine the general elements of the assurances, as highlighted in several texts submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. We also recall that other proposals were to be submitted to our Conference and were then withdrawn in view of the lack of progress within the Ad Hoc Committee. These documents could very felicitously be merged in a rolling text.

As regards the content to be given to this convention text, allow me to sum up our national approach as follows. We should expressly reaffirm, firstly the commitment of States never to be the first to resort to the use or the threat of use of military force to settle their political disputes and secondly the right of States to unilateral or collective self-defence in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter, it being understood that recourse to nuclear weapons should never be considered as a legitimate response to a conventional attack.

We should include provisions concerning ways of dealing with conflicts between a non-nuclear State and a nuclear State. We should not forget that in such cases, as a result of the right of veto wielded by the nuclear States, which are the same as the permanent member States of the Security Council, the rights stemming from the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter are not guaranteed to non-nuclear States.

The assurances to be incorporated in the convention machinery should be assurances against use as well as assurances against the threat of use. Indeed, we believe that this right should be reaffirmed by any nuclear State as soon as it enters into armed conflict with a non-nuclear State covered by the guarantees. International assistance to a non-nuclear State facing a threat should include: firstly, diplomatic and political aspects (reaffirmation by the other nuclear countries of the right of the non-nuclear State to be neither threatened nor attacked, whatever their own assessment of responsibilities in the conflict under way); secondly, practical measures likely to promote strict respect for the provisions of the convention. In the event of a direct nuclear attack, it is clear that assistance could then be only health and economic assistance for the attacked State. Provision could also be made for sanctions machinery vis-à-vis the State that has used the nuclear weapon.

Who should provide these assurances? In our view, only the nuclear States within the meaning of the 1968 Treaty should have this prerogative. Any other States possessing nuclear weapons should destroy the weapons that they might have acquired in order to be eligible for negative security assurances. In the event of an attack on or threat to a non-nuclear State covered by these assurances on the part of a nuclear Power other than the

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Five, this State should benefit from international assistance at least equal to that which could be extended to it if the attack or the threat of nuclear attack came from one of the Five.

Who should benefit? The legitimate beneficiaries of these assurances should of course be, first and foremost, the States parties to the convention. Efforts should also be made to ensure that the security commitments entered into under other international agreements are not interpreted in such a manner as to restrict the scope or the field of application of the convention arrangements.

Exemptions. We can envisage only those that would stem from the refusal of States to accede to the convention, from their denouncing it, or from conduct by them contrary to the commitments entered into under the convention.

The convention should be open, in the first place, on the one hand, to the five nuclear States, which are the exclusive providers of assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on the other to States which do not possess nuclear weapons and are not bound by military alliances with nuclear States. It is true that specific provisions could be found whereby the benefit of such assurances extended to the member States of military alliances with nuclear countries. These States should, however, be in a position to respect the terms of the convention.

As regards the verification of such a convention we see, firstly, verification that the actions of States parties are in conformity with the commitments entered into under the treaty. We could legitimately contemplate machinery for verification of the non-nuclear status of a State benefiting from the assurances, inter alia in pursuance of other international agreements.

Sanctions. The measures that can be taken should be clearly spelt out. They will, of course, differ as between a nuclear State and a non-nuclear State, because of the effects of these sanctions on the general balance of the convention: might we, for instance, envisage a non-nuclear State which is in breach being excluded from the field of application of the security assurances, but we could not do the same vis-à-vis a nuclear State.

As I said at the outset of my statement, these are a few general ideas to which my delegation accords great importance.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to ask you to accept the congratulations of my delegation on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1994 session. I would also like to tell you personally how pleased I am to see you preside over this august assembly at this crucial stage. The effective manner in which you have conducted our work has already borne fruit; this is borne out by the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its work and working groups have already been set up. I would also like to express my appreciation

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to your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his efforts at the end of the previous session and during the inter-sessional period, efforts which made it possible to prepare the ground well for the work of our present session.

(continued in English)

I should also like to echo the greetings already addressed to the distinguished Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. In the person of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, we salute a distinguished diplomat and a disarmament expert of repute and long standing. We are likewise happy to greet Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, the new Deputy Secretary-General. Finally, let me warmly welcome the distinguished representatives who have joined us at this table for the first time: Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, Ambassador Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela. We look forward to productive cooperation with them all. Let me also say how much we shall be missing the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan. I wish him all the best in his new career.

In my intervention today, I propose to concentrate briefly on the key elements of Poland's position in respect to the CD agenda items this year, in the first place the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In due course, our views will be presented in greater detail in the more appropriate setting of the relevant ad hoc committees or other subsidiary bodies.

Let me observe at the outset how correct the Secretary-General of the United Nations was in observing in his much appreciated message to the 1994 CD session that "the changed international environment had created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, while also posing new challenges". There is no need before this audience to decode the term "changed international environment", nor is it, indeed, necessary to spell out the acronyms of the landmark disarmament agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, which have been reached due to the end of the cold war and the demise of a bipolar world. Today, we are called upon to seize that historic window of opportunity again and seek agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear test explosions for all time. With the confrontation of yesteryear replaced by cooperation today, the prospects for early progress towards this goal seem better than at any time since the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. We must do our best to make the most of these prospects.

We will all readily agree - I am sure - with the Secretary-General's view in another of his reports (CD/1176), notably that disarmament agreements "should be seen as part of the larger network of international cooperative behaviour which is designed to safeguard the security of all nations". Absolutely right. Yet - unfortunately - international security cannot be taken for granted today, notwithstanding progress in disarmament. In Europe and elsewhere, the challenges to international security are only too familiar. They range from economic, political and military instability of individual countries and regions to ethnic strife and to bloody regional conflicts whose grisly results are for everyone to see on the TV screens. Whether posed by

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aggravating instability for reviving nationalisms and xenophobia, or by the apparent appeal of insane ideas to tamper with frontiers or the Statehood of sovereign States - the challenges to international security architecture based upon freedom and democracy cannot be dismissed or taken lightly. To my country they are certainly of grave concern. They, inter alia, have led the Polish Prime Minister to Brussels to put his signature to the Partnership for Peace concept.

On the other hand, there are important positive developments which are rightly heartening to the international community. Poland joins in the general satisfaction at the recent trilateral agreement reached by the Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine, providing for the elimination of all nuclear arms from the latter's territory. We look forward to early ratification and implementation of that crucial agreement. We also applaud Ukrainian resolve to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State. Together with the recent accessions to the NPT of Armenia, Belarus, Guyana and Mauritania as well as the declared intention of Algeria and Argentina to follow suit, these facts testify to a remarkable momentum building up in favour of universality of the Treaty.

We have listened with great interest to the important statements made so far, especially by representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers, on their positions concerning comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - our top priority this year. The significance of these statements for our objectives cannot escape anyone. We study them with due care.

Turning to the views of my delegation in regard to a CTBT, I should like first to say that we share in the appreciation expressed to the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, for his endeavours last year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The in-depth examination of various aspects of detection and verification techniques, and the subsequent elaboration of a treaty-specific mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1994, offer us a chance to proceed expeditiously to purpose-oriented work on the provisions of a multilateral treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests for all time. In the view of my delegation, we will be greatly assisted in this task by the Swedish draft CTBT text with its annexed draft protocol and by the Australian working paper containing a valuable draft structural outline of such a treaty. Both these documents represent useful reference points in our work and we are grateful to Sweden and Australia for their contributions.

While a CTBT is long overdue, we can well understand the caution transpiring from suggestions that "haste should be made slowly" and that a "greater premium should be put on a good treaty than on an early one". It goes without saying that neither a good nor an early accord would be facilitated if the appeals of Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton for a continued test moratorium were to go unheeded.

The scope of a ban covering "all tests for all time" is referred to in the 1963 PTB Treaty. It seems to come close to what we should be aiming at - some 30 years later - in a CTBT viewed, first and foremost, as an effective

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non-proliferation instrument. While such an instrument - in our view - should cover "peaceful nuclear explosions" and dismiss any "threshold" idea, we find attractive and warranted arguments against extending the scope of the ban to cover also "preparatory activities". Such activities would not lend themselves to precise definition nor to easy and foolproof verification. What is certain about such a ban, however, is that it would militate against the need for verification that is cost-effective. It could, moreover, come dangerously close to tampering with the recognized principle of freedom of scientific research and interfering with legitimate peaceful activities.

The provisions on the entry into force of the future treaty should, in our view, satisfy at least two requirements. First, they should not set the entry-into-force hurdle discouragingly high, thus in effect delaying entry into effect of the treaty; and secondly entry-into-force should be conditional on mandatory support of the CTBT by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, by the recognized nuclear-capable "threshold" countries as well as by those which are known to operate research and power-generating nuclear reactors. A mandatory ratification of the future treaty by all members of the CD, especially following enlargement of its membership, would come close to meeting these requirements.

Provisions on a credible and effective verification system may pose the greatest difficulty, if only because of their sheer weight in the treaty. We believe that such a system, by and large, patterned after the CWC verification mechanism, should envisage, inter alia on-site challenge inspections and a sanctions system meaningful enough to deter would-be violators. A seismic monitoring system would, of course, stand at the core of such a mechanism. Institution-wise, a satisfactory yet financially conservative solution should be assured by a judicious marriage between the Vienna-located International Atomic Energy Agency, with its recognized experience, manpower and administrative infrastructure, and a CTBT-specific organism responsible for monitoring data exchange and the handling of related activities. The presentation by the representative of the IAEA yesterday at the NTB Ad Hoc Committee was extremely useful and we thank him for this and for the answers he gave to many questions asked by various delegations.

Let me, at this juncture, make also one observation of a more general nature. Now, we believe that while the elaboration of an effective and universally applicable CTBT, on the one hand, and the extension of the NPT for an indefinite period, on the other, represent but two sides of the same broader issue of non-proliferation, these goals should be sought on their own merits. Any attempts at establishing whatever artificial linkage between them would be certainly unhelpful. At the same time, of course, it would be less than realistic to deny the existence of a clear feedback relationship between them.

The proposed ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices should be seen as the last aspect of the non-proliferation triad. The issue of the "cut-off" is a legitimate subject for the Conference on Disarmament to deal with. We welcome its inclusion in our agenda. Following an exploratory stage of open-ended

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consultations, and if warranted by their results, an Ad Hoc Committee should be established to proceed to the elaboration of a suitable draft agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be entrusted with responsibility in regard to its verification.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has, unfortunately, been unable so far to make significant headway, despite a suitable mandate. Hopefully, the existing political difficulties will be removed soon, as they should, and tangible progress will be possible in 1994. In this connection we take note with interest of the readiness of the Russian Federation to open consultations among the five nuclear-weapon Powers on a possible joint formula of "negative" assurances. We believe also that the precedent-setting example of security guarantees extended to Ukraine deserves careful examination within the context of efforts to arrive at a multilateral instrument of a legally binding character.

The Polish delegation is encouraged by the results scored by the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space last year. They leave no doubt that confidence-building measures offer the most promising avenue to reaching an accord, or accords, in that area. Purpose-oriented work in this respect would be rendered more rewarding by a mandate somewhat broader than the one under which the Ad Hoc Committee worked until last September.

Poland attaches major importance to the question of transparency in armaments as well as to the issue of confidence-building in the military sphere in general, issues which owing to the positive CSCE experience have for us a special meaning. Thanks to the well-structured debate in the Ad Hoc Committee last year and to the many specific constructive proposals submitted by a number of delegations, that subsidiary organ is now better prepared to pursue the goal of enhanced transparency. Congratulating the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Boytha, on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, we pledge him full support and constructive cooperation.

In our view, the process of increasing military transparency should be both gradual and non-discriminatory so as to promote and encourage its universal appeal and participation in it. Given this consideration, we are positively disposed towards sustained efforts with a view to developing and expanding the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In this respect, the proposals submitted last year by France and the United Kingdom seem to be particularly relevant. We also look forward to the results of the meetings of a group of experts, chaired by our distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Wagenmakers and mandated to explore the possible expansion of both quality and quantity of data in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We take note of his invitation to delegations for useful input of the CD for the benefit of the group of experts. My delegation shall comply in due course.

In concluding my statement, let me comment briefly on the all-important question of the enlargement of the CD membership. We are very appreciative of

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Ambassador O'Sullivan's strenuous efforts as special coordinator last year. His broadly supported recommendations regrettably failed to gain consensus. The commendable inter-sessional endeavours of Ambassador Zahran have also been to no avail. We regret that, as a result, the delegations concerned could not take their seats in the CD. The latest initiative of the delegation of Mexico would have had our support, on the condition of its acceptability to the interested parties. We should like to trust that the contemplated consultation process will lead to a satisfactory solution and that the day when the 23 delegations take their seats as full-fledged CD members will not be unduly delayed. Indeed, it should not be delayed, if only because of what is at stake - the missed benefit of their equitable participation in the CTBT negotiating process now, and risking their critically important support of the accord, once it is in place.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me, which I particularly appreciated coming from a country with which France has always maintained particularly cordial relations. I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey, Mr. Arar.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey) (translated from French): Mr. President, as this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor under your presidency, I would like to begin my statement by expressing to you our appreciation of the manner in which you have been conducting the work of this Conference. We are sure that your well-recognized skills in the field of disarmament have played a paramount role in the speed with which this Conference has been able to commence its activities at the beginning of this annual session. Relations between France and Turkey will soon be celebrating their five-hundredth anniversary. Begun in a spirit of cooperation by Francis I and Suleyman the Magnificent in the sixteenth century, these relations have often been based on cooperation, have sometimes taken a turn towards rivalry or were torn by war. But they have always had a specific character and have always been enriching. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to pay a renewed tribute to your country.

Turkey expresses its wish to become a full-fledged member and to contribute actively to the accomplishment of the tasks of the Conference on Disarmament. It is time to explain why Turkey wishes to become a member of this body.

The world is undergoing transformation, interaction with regional changes. On the one hand, the international community would like to believe in a hope for peace built on political solidarity and economic cooperation leading to a more prosperous way of life. On the other hand, it must identify the risks and tackle the obstacles which impede the realization of these aspirations. The gulf between the concept of a new world order and a harsh post-cold-war reality is growing progressively. This gulf, with its inherent dangers, is flagrant in the regions around Turkey. At the crossroads of the most troubled regions of the world - the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean - Turkey has been able to create a refuge of stability, democracy and secularism. The

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Eastern Mediterranean, cradle of several civilizations, is a source of inspiration and a place of predilection for monotheistic religions. It is a sea in which continents meet. Throughout its history humanity has witnessed innumerable power struggles for control of this sea. Today the problems are different. The problem of the Middle East, which dates back half a century, has left its effects in the region. The differences among the inhabitants are of all kinds. Economic difficulties assail countries with growing populations. The nature of the political regimes in these countries displays substantial differences. Five NATO countries, with democratic systems and advanced economies, including the least developed among them, have a coastal zone in the northern Mediterranean. As for the coastal States of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, they reflect economic and political contradictions. This situation is a threat to peace. If the enthusiasm and hope invested in the peace process in the Middle East is not illusory, we can envisage from this historic turning-point cooperation on an extended regional scale leading to the triggering of dynamic processes which could transform this entire zone, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, into an area of peace and prosperity.

It is undeniable that the recent international changes have altered traditional geopolitical structures and have redefined a new approach. The concept of "Eurasia", in particular, deserves a reassessment: the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the confluence of newly independent States with different cultural and ethnic traditions around the Black Sea and in the Balkan, Caucasus and Central Asian regions have established new parameters for cooperation or for conflict. The Balkans have been described as the power-keg of Europe and considered as the "Middle East" of this continent. History has confirmed that Europe cannot achieve stability as long as Balkan security is not assured. Today, the Balkans have again become the most unstable part of Europe. After the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia, ambitions in the service of a greater Serbia, genocide and ethnic cleansing inflicted upon Bosnian Muslims represent a risk that the conflict will spread to the neighbouring countries. After the dismantling of the Soviet Union, which shared a common border with Turkey, the trend towards the disintegration that has become apparent in the Caucasus region has not yet abated. Ethno-nationalism, aggression, armed conflict and invasion have seriously jeopardized the already fragile peace and stability in this region. Long-term interests and civilized options for the formation of a prosperous and peaceful region were regrettably sacrificed to military opportunism and short-term political adventures.

Turkey, located as it is between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zones, and hence displaying exclusive geopolitical features, is endowed with considerable historical experience that can contribute to the reduction of differences between the countries of this political and economic conglomeration. It so happens that Turkey is the only country that is a member, on the one hand, of the Council of Europe, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and, on the other, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Organization for Economic Cooperation (which is a regional body) and the Black Sea Cooperation Council. Turkey also enjoys close relations with the European Union, with which it will

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be establishing a customs union as of 1995, and also maintains links with the Western European Union. The specific and exclusive characteristic of our country and hence its success is its ability to harmonize Islam and democracy through a secular approach.

International relations can no longer be pursued effectively without addressing the issues of arms control and disarmament with the necessary vigilance. It is clear that in the absence of necessary measures, armament efforts, as history has shown, can only engender new conflicts. Arms control and disarmament are therefore valuable means to establish and maintain peace. Turkey has striven to pursue the objectives of disarmament and arms control even during the cold war years. With the beginning of a new era in relations among States, Turkey seeks to become involved in disarmament negotiations with the ambition of contributing to universal peace. Being located at the heart of this chessboard that I have just referred to, we are aware of the role that we have to play, both in our corner of the world and at the international level, to contribute to the strengthening of security. This justifies the reasons why my country upholds its right to membership of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference, being the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, has important and urgent matters to deal with on its agenda. The negotiations which have just begun on the nuclear-test-ban treaty are a topical example. The urgent need to conclude a multilaterally negotiated and universally verifiable treaty, which, if it is to be effective, must enjoy universal participation, fully justifies the need for expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. It would therefore be irrational to have stated before the Conference that this future treaty should be signed and ratified, aside from the recognized nuclear Powers, by the threshold States and also by those which possess nuclear power or research facilities, without taking into consideration that most of these States have no opportunity to participate as full partners in the negotiations. It would be illogical to invite some of these States to participate in the future seismic network, stipulating that their incorporation in the system is of capital importance for future compliance with the treaty, without taking account of the fact that they possess no right to participate in the decision-making process. It would be unfair to seek to share the rights and duties fairly among all the parties to the treaty without that fairness being established to allow possible States parties to participate legitimately in the decision-making machinery when those rights and obligations are negotiated. My delegation has repeated several times before this august body that if the Conference on Disarmament intends to maintain its credibility, it must spare no effort to adapt itself to the changes that have occurred in the world. These changes, whose effects are far-reaching, are sufficiently compelling that the member countries should abandon the illusory prestige of belonging to a select club. Otherwise, many countries which for a long time have wished to participate in this work will inevitably lose their motivation and as a result the credibility of the Conference will be jeopardized, coupled with a reluctance to accede to the instruments prepared by it. Turkey, since it is prepared to contribute as best it can to the work of the Conference, is profoundly disappointed and

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frustrated by the outcome of the last session, when an extraordinary opportunity for the expansion of this body was not grasped.

The expansion of the Conference on Disarmament presupposes a realistic and honest approach. We must take into account the needs of the Conference for the active continuation of its work, the interest shown by countries wishing to join and also the equitable distribution of seats among the regional groups. Against these yardsticks, the list submitted last year by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia strikes an excellent balance. Since the work has unfortunately not been completed, this list, kept as it is, should constitute a point of departure in the future consultations.

The difficulty for us lies in the objection against Israel and Iraq, both of which are on the list. It is unrealistic at the present time to conceive of an expansion of the membership of the Conference without the participation of Israel and Iraq. Israel is one of the principal players in the peace process in the Middle East. This peace process is unthinkable without taking into account disarmament and arms control. The correlation to be established between the nuclear capability of Israel and its membership of the Conference should provide not for its exclusion but its admission to this body. It would be erroneous to think that Israel is the only country in the region which has not yet adhered to the NPT. I would like to point out that on numerous bilateral and multilateral occasions Turkey has invited Israel to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place its facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime. We really think that its admission would be conducive to progress towards this objective. As for Iraq, a country which has been over armed, another important Middle East State, it is subject to sanctions applied in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council. Inspections conducted on its territory are aimed at disarming it. In principle, it would therefore be natural for this country to be included in the new membership of the Conference on Disarmament. However, it is understandable, in the case of a country to which the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter have been applied, to envisage its temporary exclusion from certain United Nations bodies in order to subject it to diplomatic isolation, while a linkage is established between the raising of sanctions and its full participation in the work of those bodies. In the case of Iraq's participation in the activities of the CD, we are of the view that the Legal Office of the United Nations would be able to formulate a proposal that would be perfectly acceptable to all parties.

To be sure, putting into effect the expansion of the membership of the Conference is no easy responsibility. My delegation supports the idea of appointing a special coordinator for this purpose. We are convinced that the coordinator whom you will designate during your presidency will have all the necessary powers to conduct an assessment of the needs of the Conference, an analysis of the interest displayed by the countries applying for full-fledged membership and an outline of the equitable distribution of seats. He must of course retain what has been achieved in the past in the field of expansion. We look forward to his appointment as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and the very kind words he addressed to me, which moved me deeply. I particularly appreciated the reminder of the long-standing relations between our two countries. In turn I should like to greet the representative of a friendly country and ally playing such an important role in the international arena. I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): First, I wish to welcome His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, with whom I have had the pleasure of being acquainted during my visits to Baghdad in the years we were negotiating peace between our two countries, and I recall the positive role and contribution he was always prepared to make and to play for the process of peace and for the evolving relationships between our two countries.

For years, the international community has been calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. This is indeed a disarmament issue that came to birth almost at the same time as did nuclear weapons. Thirty years ago, there was the apparent conclusion that one has to settle, for the time being, for only a partial ban so that, at least, space and the ocean beds would be excluded from testing. Today, finally, we have come to a point - keeping our fingers crossed - that a comprehensive test ban seems at reach. The Conference on Disarmament has an important task ahead of it in negotiating and concluding a treaty. Yet the enthusiasm has been marred, at times, by several conditionings and linkages raised at the very outset of negotiations. Even at this very early stage, we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, feel the pressure and duress building up in and around negotiations.

It is fine to derive from all this that we need to move forward and fast and to conclude a treaty urgently and during the shortest possible time. There are many dangers on the way that threaten the fate of negotiations. At the same time, though, one cannot take comfort in having to negotiate and feel that positions, including essential positions, may be compromised to avoid a situation that negotiations would be harmed, or ceased.

It is true, of course, that the non-nuclear-weapon States are the strong proponents of the nuclear test ban and that they are most keen to see the negotiations succeed. But it is not fair that this sense of eager enthusiasm be misinterpreted and abused.

The approach which has generally been followed so far gives the impression that nuclear-weapon States are making a huge sacrifice to have merely committed themselves to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. As such, they have attempted to set, in various ways, the terms of negotiations. It is also implied that the objective, the main target I should say, is to stop any possible nuclear test by those who are on the verge of becoming nuclear. It seems the nuclear-weapon States believe that a special situation should be reserved only for them; that what is done by them is not a source of concern for others and that they should deal with their nuclear weapons and whatever

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relates to it within their own set of coordinates. The impression is given that the threat that needs to be contained is that of the possible newcomers, those on the threshold.

We are all aware that the CTBT is a non-proliferation scheme intended both to avert vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. We are also aware that no commitments to nuclear disarmament are yet made. In fact, even an intention for complete nuclear disarmament is not yet registered despite the enormous changes in international relations following the cold war. We do not, nevertheless, agree to the notion that the threat is limited to the emerging nuclear-weapon States and to horizontal proliferation. Indeed, we non-nuclear-weapons States see this exercise as only a step towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is the cardinal objective. Everything else finds meaning only under its shadow; be it the CTBT, PTBT, NPT, START, test-ban moratoriums or the prohibition of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes. In fact, it is for this reason that we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, welcome such negotiations; that we will move one step towards nuclear disarmament and that we remove the reasons cited for the maintenance of nuclear weapons one after the other.

We see the test ban as the last hurdle to overcome. We shall soon expect a time-bound framework for complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. We therefore wish to invite nuclear-weapon States to take more prudence into the conditions, the restraints they are putting forward.

Before we start negotiations we have bene told that there will be no entry into force unless all nuclear-weapon States and all those on the threshold join in. The suggestion has then been made that the moment a new nuclear-weapon State emerges, the negotiations will stop and thus the Treaty will fail to exist. We have also been told that the negotiations may be arrested if, despite the prevailing moratorium, a nuclear test is carried out. At the same time, calls for exceptional provisions are already on the table.

A provision for nuclear tests for "safety purposes" for the nuclear States is being requested; "safety", I believe, meaning the ability to keep the current stockpiles of nuclear weapons operational, properly targeted and risk-free. On this, I must say, if there is to be any special provision, it should be one that would be accorded to all equally. We cannot start the CTBT while already contemplating privileges and exceptionalities. The CTBT, by its scope, must be comprehensive and non-discriminatory and on the basis of equal rights and responsibilities.

On the current moratorium on testing it has been stated that it must hold, and hold perfectly, if negotiations are not to collapse. Of course, we too believe in the significance of this moratorium and believe too that it should not be broken. It should, instead, be extended indefinitely and should include a solid commitment from all nuclear-weapon States. Other States, particularly those on the threshold, also should refrain from testing. It is, therefore, understandable to interpret such positions as a means to deter possible new testing. But it is inconceivable that the negotiations should,

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in reality, be hostage to someone's failure to observe the moratorium. These negotiations have their own virtue and should not be threatened by events here and there.

As to the conditions raised for the entry into force, if they are aimed as a lever to ensure universality, one may find merit in them. Indeed, these are conditions that would be extremely useful if they are set forth solemnly in relation to the NPT. It will be a big boost to the NPT to state, firmly, that it would only be extended if and only if all nuclear-weapon States, as well as all those on the threshold, join and remain fully committed to it, and to amend the Treaty in such a way that it would be nullified the moment a new nuclear-weapon State emerged. The raison d'être of the NPT is to forbid the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. This has not been the case. Therefore, such firmness may indeed prove to serve the NPT and its survival well.

On the question of the relationship or, more properly said, the linkage between a CTBT and the NPT we have heard various statements. In the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the forty-eighth General Assembly it was stated that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States view the successful outcome of the CTBT as decisive to the fate, to any extension of the NPT. We have heard, on the other hand, from some nuclear-weapon States that the CTBT will not even be negotiated if the extension of the NPT could not be guaranteed. I believe we can conclude from this, as a shared position supported by all, that the CTBT and NPT are interlinked and the conclusion, extension, success and survival of any one depends fully on the other. It should not any more be a question of which comes first, the chicken or the egg. We need and require both. One cannot be without the other.

I would attempt now to present our views on some other issues relevant to the negotiations on the CTBT. On verification, I believe, we must first concentrate on the current situation and the sort of nuclear tests that we have seen so far. To focus on future possibilities in nuclear tests complicates our work. It is, yet, something that we need to bear in mind. As we want a foolproof treaty and a long-lasting one, we may be compelled to envisage the impact from the advance of technology in the future. We cannot even disregard, outright, the possibility of a simulated nuclear test by supercomputers. But, again, we must be cautious not to lose focus, not to make things more complex and move within a framework that will keep the treaty feasible, promptly achievable and realizable.

It appears that the seismic network is the only viable and ready-to-use option as the core of the verification. Other mechanisms may gradually be applied as complementary, but it is essential that any such mechanisms should be under international control.

As regards the organization for the implementation of the treaty, if IAEA is to be entrusted with this task, it should not only become technically prepared, but it needs as well to make adjustments in its decision-making structure. These adjustments are, incidentally, also needed for the extension

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of the NPT; adjustments that would enhance the role of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and to the eventual CTBT and give them priority in its main decision-making body vis-à-vis the non-members.

On the suggestion to prohibit preparations, the idea as we understand is to foresee measures against preparations the moment they are detected and reported. This is a matter that deserves further study. Logic has it that if one is preparing for a test, why should others wait until the hand is on the trigger and not move to stop it in advance? The problem lies, on the other hand, in how to define preparations, how to trace them, who should report them, who will decide, how one avoids abusive reports.

It is clear that many complications and complexities stand in our way if the idea of prohibiting preparations is taken up. The idea, however, guides us to think more seriously about the existing sites. No doubt if any State has any site available for nuclear tests it remains only one step from the test itself. We should, in our endeavour, examine how we can best deal with this question. I believe one possible approach is to request all parties to declare the sites that have been used or are ready to be used for nuclear testing as well as the specifically designed equipment contained in them. We may decide then that such equipment must be destroyed under verification and the site must be closed.

On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, arguments have been raised that no such thing exists and that any nuclear test can have a military application. Our objective is, of course, to have a comprehensive treaty, one that leaves no loophole. As such, we are inclined towards a position that no test of whatsoever nature would be permitted. We are, none the less, apprehensive about the notion of duality of use. A notion prevalent in the developed world that if there is an intention, almost anything with a peaceful use may be diverted for military application and, therefore, must be monitored, controlled or banned. We have had devastating experience in this regard. We have suffered. In the chemical field we saw this notion shaped into export limitations on many chemicals beyond what the CWC provided for. In the BWC, many substances, necessary ingredients for vaccines and serums, have been controlled under the pretext of dual use. In the nuclear arena, the situation has been much, much worse. Technology and material related to peaceful use have been heavily curtailed despite clear commitments for their accessibility in the NPT. Indeed, it has become a matter of course for the developed countries in the fields of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological technology that the developing countries should be deprived of many things perceived by them to have dual use. It is this persistent noting that makes us hesitate on what is now being suggested about the prohibition of all nuclear tests including peaceful ones. This is an issue, therefore, that should be extensively elaborated and carefully examined before it is concluded.

What I have just presented reflects our general views on the CTBT at this inaugurating phase of negotiations. We shall proceed to participate in negotiations with a view to conclude the convention at the earliest possible time. Hence, alongside the NPT, PTBT and other non-proliferation treaties, we will have curbed further vertical and horizontal proliferation and will be better-equipped to aim directly at nuclear disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): That brings us to the end of the list of speakers for today. I understand that another representative wishes to take the floor. I therefore give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I had not intended to ask for the floor this morning but unfortunately the outlandish intervention by the Foreign Minister of Iraq that we were subjected to as the first order of business here today requires a response.

First of all, I should like to remind the Minister that what he describes as a "war of aggression launched against Iraq in 1991" was, as all the world knows, a military operation undertaken by the international community with the full support of the United Nations Security Council and designed simply to put an end to Iraq's own acts of aggression the previous year against a small and friendly neighbour. So, instead of standing truth on its head, let us review a few facts.

Iraq, on 26 November 1993, informed the United Nations Security Council that it had formally accepted the Security Council's resolution 715 adopted unanimously in October 1991. In so doing, Iraq expressed its expectation that the United Nations would move to lift sanctions imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We have heard that same extraordinary demand repeated here this morning. Iraq's acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 is more than two years overdue and, thus far, it is purely declaratory. In this regard, we not that Iraq accepted United Nations Security Council resolution 687 within one week of its adoption in April 1991 but since then the Iraqi record of non-compliance speaks for itself. Iraq must establish a sound record of full, sustained cooperation with a long-term monitoring regime. Details of this regime are still to be developed by the United Nations Special Commission and by IAEA. We see no reason now, or in the foreseeable future, for the United Nations to consider modifying the sanctions regime. UNSCOM's Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekéus, has made clear, in recent reports to the Security Council, that Iraq remains in violation of provisions of resolution 687 relating to the destruction of weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. Remaining gaps in our understanding of these programmes involving, for example, potentially 100 unaccounted-for Scud missiles, are serious and must be resolved. Iraq remains in violation of all other elements of resolution 687 relating, for example, to the sanctity of the Kuwait/Iraqi border, compensation to victims, return of or accounting for missing persons, return of property and renunciation of terrorism. Iraq remains in violation of all other United Nations Security Council resolutions passed in connection with its invasion of Kuwait and subsequent defeat by the coalition, notably Security Council resolution 688, which calls on Baghdad to end repression of its own citizens. The record shows that since the end of the Gulf war, Iraq has systematically sought to avoid or modify the requirements imposed on it by the international community, to comply with those requirements grudgingly and incompletely only when the international community made it clear that there was no alternative, and to roll back even steps taken to comply with its obligations when given the chance to do so. The burden of proof remains on Iraq to demonstrate a good-faith willingness to meet the requirements which

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have been imposed upon it. The evidence unfortunately suggests that Baghdad's aim remains what it has always been - to avoid those requirements and to reestablish as quickly as possible the capability to threaten its neighbours and to repress its own people. Against this background it is clear that the international community should insist on a very high standard in assessing Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715. The resolution sets out a highly intrusive, comprehensive regime to ensure that Iraq cannot clandestinely resume its weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. The international community should support vigorous efforts by UNSCOM and IAEA to establish such a regime on a firm and sustainable basis. In light of Iraq's record of reneging on its commitments, a lengthy period of full and verified compliance and cooperation with the regime will be essential to demonstrate its workability and sustainability. It is difficult to see how such a track record could be credibly established in under a year from the time the regime is up and running.

It should be clear from the above that we consider any discussion now of lifting sanctions to be grossly premature. To the extent that Iraq's decision to accept United Nations Security Council resolution 715 is a significant step, it is clear that it would never have occurred had not the international community stood firm on the importance of Iraq's meeting the requirements imposed by the United Nations. A clear, consistent message that the community of nations would settle for nothing short of full compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions is the surest means of guaranteeing that Iraq's acceptance of United Nations resolution 715 will be translated into meaningful actions and that the international community's determination that Iraq should cease to be a threat to peace and its own citizens will be realized.

Mr. AL-KHERO (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): I am sorry that my country's delegation has requested the floor again. I wish to emphasize that the statement by my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs is clear and explicit and deals with facts that might not be to the liking of the representatives of some States that are ill-disposed towards Iraq. I do not wish to speak at length, like the delegations of a number of member States, preferring to preserve a harmonious atmosphere in keeping with the status of a distinguished forum such as the Conference on Disarmament. My country's delegation reserves the right to reply at a later time.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Iraq. Does no other delegation wish to take the floor? I would now like to take up an issue regarding the organization of the work of the Conference. You will recall that during the plenary meeting of 1 February, the Conference decided to appoint Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. In the meantime Ambassador Hoffmann has been designated Chairman of the Working Group on Verification of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Consequently, the Group of Western States, whose turn it is to chair the Committee on negative security assurances, Ambassador Alain Guillaume of Belgium for the chairmanship of that Committee. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I take this opportunity to express our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Guillaume upon his appointment to this post and wish him every success in his duties.

With respect to the only remaining pending issue, namely the expansion of the membership of the Conference, I wish to inform the Conference that at this stage no consensus exists concerning the proposals presented respectively by Mexico, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America. Nor is there a consensus on the appointment of a special coordinator to deal with this issue. Consequently the Conference will have to find an appropriate way of progressing in this area.

As usual, the secretariat has distributed the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. The timetable has been drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and may be amended as needed. If there are no objections, I will take it that this timetable is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): With your permission I would now like to say a few words in closing. My term of office as President is coming to an end. I do not intend to embark on an assessment of the results we have arrived at in the course of the last few weeks. Like each of you, I am pleased that the Conference has been able to decide on its agenda expeditiously for this session, to establish the ad hoc committees on a nuclear test ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and transparency in armaments. Likewise, we have happily been able to appoint two special coordinators entrusted respectively with the question of fissile material and the updating of the agenda of the Conference. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its work promptly and set up its two working groups. All this is positive and it shows that where there is a will, problems can be overcome.

The question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference remains at a standstill. In September 1993 the Conference was not able to adopt the recommendations made by the special coordinator at the time. On 27 January last, Ambassador Zahran was compelled to note that consensus could not be reached on the issue. The proposal submitted by the delegation of Mexico has not succeeded in gaining consensus, any more than two other proposals submitted since. Finally, even the appointment of a special coordinator, the principle of which was contained in the presidential statement adopted on 25 January last, encountered opposition. The Conference will have to draw its conclusions from this situation, which is particularly regrettable. Firstly for the candidate countries which are waiting, and some have been waiting for many years, and they increasingly have the feeling that they are knocking on the door of a forum that does not hear them, whereas each of its members, day in day out, stresses the importance of this problem and the urgent need to resolve it. This situation is also detrimental to the credibility of the Conference, as regards both its representativeness and its ability to take new realities into account. If I may express a wish, it is that the Conference

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should, before it is too late, find its way out of the world of make-believe and shoulder its responsibilities. There is no doubt that the truth would then appear. This would be a mark of consideration for the candidate countries. It is a vital necessity for the future of the Conference.

I would not wish to conclude without reiterating my gratitude to the group coordinators and the delegation of China for their constant availability and the support they have given me. My warm thanks also go to the secretariat, and most particularly to Mr. Bensmail and his colleagues for the exemplary, friendly and effective manner in which they have helped us to do our job. Finally, I wish Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany every success in the task he will be taking up as of next week, and I should like to assure him of my full cooperation.

We have just completed our order of business for today. Consequently, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before adjourning I would like to call on the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): I am extremely honoured by the confidence which the CD has shown in appointing me Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances. I can assure the members of the Conference that I will do my utmost to achieve progress in this delicate but vital area. However, in the short term, given the recent nature of the decision which concerns me, I would crave the Conference's indulgence for my first decision, which is to defer the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee by eight days. I plan to follow the momentum of Ambassador Hoffmann and look forward to a general debate next week based on the elements that had already been distributed to you by the German delegation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 24 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.